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Dear participants of the World Congress, ladies and gentlemen! 
Allow me, on behalf of the International Conference of Constitutional Review Bodies of 
the States of New Democracy and on behalf of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of 
Armenia, to welcome the Second World Conference and wish it productive work. 
 
I. Background 
I am representing the International Conference of Constitutional Review Bodies of the 
States of New Democracy. In October of 2006 in Yerevan our Conference, having reviewed 
the draft Charter of the World Conference of Constitutional Justice Bodies, came up with a 
positive assessment of the institutionalization process of the global cooperation between 
constitutional review bodies and endorsed the draft Charter. The subsequent work over the 
draft was essentially of editorial nature. We welcome all efforts towards subsequent 
strengthening of international cooperation in the area of judicial constitutional review. 
We are also grateful to the Supreme Court of Brazil and the Venice Commission of the 
Council of Europe for the great effort invested in the brilliant organization of the Second 
World Conference on Constitutional Justice. 
 
II. Scope of the issue 
The theme of this Congress has been discussed at great length at the Bureau of our 
World Organization and was eventually acknowledged to bequite topical on many counts. In 
this communication I shall only dwell upon the problems of assuring the separation and 
balance of powers in conditions of social transformation, from the perspective of 
guaranteeing the independence of constitutional justice. 
I would like to state first that among the dozens of various doctrinal approaches to 
specific constitutional models of the separation of powers the only incontestable and 
unanimously accepted premise is the theoretical acceptance of the need to separate and 
balance powers. As for particular approaches, forms and methods, not to mention more 
practical solutions, there exist significant discrepancies in every constitutional system around 
these.1 
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 The idea of «the separation of powers» was set forth already by the philosophers of antiquity, in 
particular by Aristotle. The member of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Armenia Raphael A. 
Papian maintains that the roots od the system of the separation of powers may be traced to the Bible. 
He concludes that «the trinity of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit design`tes three branches of 
the heavenly power, the equivalents of the legislative, executive and judicial powers of today.» (See 
Raphael A. Papian, The Christian Roots of Contemporary Law. Moscow, Norma Publishers, 2002, p. 
218. 
But the genesis of the theory of the separation of powers relates to the emergence in 17th century 
England of the political and legal theories of John Locke, whose premises on the necessity and 
importance of the separation of powers were laid down in his principal work Two Treatises of 
Government, 1690. At the same time it is universally acknowledged that the doctrine acquired its 
classicalformat in the theory of Charles Montesquieu. By developing the ideas of John Locke, 
We should admit that one of the ultimate achievements of American constitutionalism is 
exactly that the doctrine of the separation of powers in the Basic Law of the USA has 
acquired systemic integrity, and the introduction of the system of checks and balances has 
afforded the US Constitution a feature of dynamic regulation of social relations, 
transferred the constitutional system onto the tracks of dynamically developing balance. 
 
III. Contemporary diagnosis of the state of implementation of separation of powers 
How does the contemporary world address issues of the separation and balance of 
powers, considering that there emerged specialized public institutions that are called upon to 
independently guarantee the supremacy and the direct effect of the Constitution? 
We believe that by the end of the day not much has changed and the American doctrine 
of constitutional separation and balance of powers is still very much viable these days. In the 
framework of modern constitutionalism this model may be schematically presented as follows 
(see Diagram 1): 
 
Thirdly, the question of principle is that of the separation of functional, checking and 
balancing powers of constitutional institutions of power, and ensuring an optimal poise 
between these powers. 
Fourthly, an urgent goal of contemporary constitutionalism is the introduction of a viable 
and effective mechanism of intra-constitutional self-defense in order to guarantee timely 
identification, assessment and remedying of a functional constitutional balance in its 
dynamics. This is essentially the main objective of constitutional diagnostics and the 
principal goal of constitutional review in general. 
 
IV. The criteria in the basis of the separation of powers 
The criteria in the basis of ensuring the prerequisites listed above may also be presented 
through a schematic (see image 2). 
 
What are the principal requirements here towards the effective functioning of the 
system? In our opinion they are embodied in the prerequisites listed below. 
Firstly, the separation of powers is a functional, rather than institutional process, 
something that is often confused even on the level of constitutional solutions. Various 
constitutional institutions may implement particular separate constitutional-legal functions. 
Secondly, the main objective of constitutional architecture is to ensure, first and 
foremost, equilibrium in the system function-institution-powers. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
Montesquieu concludes that only the separation of power functions between various bodies of authority 
may ensure pluralistic accord in the society, human rights and freedoms, and the rule of law in the life 
of the state. 
In his turn Immanuel Kant determines the separation of powers as the requirement of pure intellect and 
the fudamental principle of the state. He claims that the state embodies three powers, i.e. the will, 
which is joined in a single trinity: the supreme power (sovereignity) as the lawmaker, that is the people; 
the executive as the Ruler; and the judiciary as afforded to persons appointed by the ruler or elected by 
the people. Kant maintained that in order for freedom to develop it is necessary for the above powers to 
be separated. But the separated powers shall not be deprived of mutual linkage. Their interaction spells 
the benefit of the state. 
Subsequent philosophical-legal advances in theory did not, in our opinion, add significant value to this 
concept. 
 
 
 
 
          Diagram 1 
 
  
We pay attention here to three basic aspects: 
1) ensuring the functional independence of the branches of power; 
2) guaranteeing full functional adequacy of the powers of constitutional institutions; 
3) ensuring continuity and inviolability of the functional constitutional balance in 
dynamics, in real public turnover, which, in turn, assumes the prevention of the so-called 
“alienation” of the constitution from real life. 
How are these approaches (that are, in our opinion, of principal significance) towards 
guaranteeing constitutional democracy and legal development assured in various countries? 
We attempted to find an answer to this question on the basis of a comparative constitutional 
analysis. 
We conventionally broke down countries into several groups: 
1) USA, Canada and Western European Countries; 
2) Eastern European countries; 
3) Latin American countries; 
4) African countries; 
5) Countries of Central and Eastern Asia; 
6) Arab countries; 
7) Post-Soviet countries. 
The last five groups, from the perspective of the problem examined, and with some 
exceptions, may be joined into one conventional group, that of countries with young 
democracies, in view of the similar results of constitutional diagnosis. 
What are the features that single out the countries in the first group? 
Firstly, in this group the internal structure of the constitution, as well as all concrete 
constitutional decisions are clearly based upon the functional separation of the powers of 
constitutional institutions, regardless of the form of governance. 
Secondly, this group is set aside by the high level of constitutional traditions and 
constitutional culture, which in turn forms a respective environment of constitutional 
perception of social processes among the public at large. 
Thirdly, the balance between freedom, power and the law is the general philosophical 
basis for constitutional decisions. 
Fourthly, in this group the continuity, elected nature, accountability and rotation of 
power is guaranteed both functionally and institutionally, which is the basis for the 
establishment of constitutional democracy. 
Fifthly, there exists no real antagonism between constitutional decisions and public 
practice. Constitutional values and principles have become a norm of social behavior. 
The second group of countries is characterized by trends of approximation towards the 
criteria basesthat characterize the first group. 
The third general group is set aside by the fact that these bases are to a certain extent 
deformed predominantly along three plains: on the level of the constitution (which includes 
the systemic deformations at the stage of the choice of the form of public governance, as well 
as its inconsistencies); deformations in the general legal system; deformed perception and 
implementation of fundamental constitutional values and principles on the level of the 
practice of implementation. 
 
V. Viability of the system of separation of powers in conditions of social transformation 
From the point of view of the establishment of constitutional democracy he third group 
of countries is characterized by the process of social transformation. 
A study of the constitutions of these countries demonstrates that at this level the rule of 
law, the power of the people, the supremacy of law, human dignity, freedom, constitutional 
democracy, the separation of powers, public accord, equality, tolerance, pluralism, solidarity 
and other universally recognized norms do formally underlie, in their organic unity, the 
constitutional decisions. Together with this the reality in these countries differs, it unfolds 
along another dimension. In all of these countries the self-sufficiency of the constitution is 
not fully ensured, and there exists a significant detachment of the fundamental constitutional 
values and principles from the social realities. The latter is characterized by the low level of 
constitutional culture, a systemic inadequacy of the mechanisms ensuring the supremacy of 
law, the existence of deformed legal system prone to internal contradictions,a lack of uniform 
value-system understanding of social bearings of social development. 
I shall begin with the constitution of my own country. The structure of the constitution 
itself, from the viewpoint of functional balance, in our opinion lacks logic. The chapters on 
the foundations of constitutional order and n human rights are immediately followed by a 
presentation of the constitutional institutes of the president, the parliament, the government 
and, alongside with these, judicial power is singled out in a separate chapter. This not only 
violates the structural logic of the constitution itself, but includes in the functional system of 
the judiciary institutions that do not administer justice. Such structural inconsistency is also 
observed in the constitutions of Bolivia, Greece2, Bulgaria, Croatia, Georgia, Uzbekistan, the 
Russian Federation, Japan and a number of other countries. Along with that there are 
countries in the group under scrutiny that not only have constitutionally enshrined a clear 
functional structure of separated powers, but devoted a stand-alone article or a chapter of the 
constitution to revealing the character of the separation of powers. Article 49, Chapter One, 
Section Three of the Mexican constitution ay serve as an example, which states that the 
ultimate power of the Federation is divided, for its implementation, into the legislative, 
executive and judicial branches. Two or all three branches may never converge into the hands 
of one person or a single corporation, and the legislative power may not be vested in one 
person, except for the case when the executive branch of the Federation is granted 
extraordinary powers under the provisions of Article 29. Under no other circumstance, with 
the exception of that set out in paragraph two of Article 131, may the executive branch 
receive the extraordinary power of issuing laws. 
Under clear constitutional formulation of the essence of the separation of powers the 
safeguards for the practical implementation thereof increase dramatically. We believe that, 
regardless of the chosen form of governance and the level of development of 
constitutionalism, a better choice was made by the countries which used either the 
institutional approach (Italy, Portugal, Belgium, Poland, etc.) or the functional approach 
(Austria, Brazil, Slovakia, etc.) as the basis for the constitutional structure. 
The main problem for the countries of the third group is in the substantial antagonism 
between the constitution and the legal reality in general. 
We maintain that the following represent the common detrimental features of systemic 
transformation in these countries: 
• instability and indefiniteness in social development and the deepening of the 
crisis of trust; 
• serious omissions and shortfalls in the implementation of value-systemic 
transformations; 
• inadequate formation of civil society; 
• lack of correspondence between the social bearings of the public at large and the 
constitutionally proclaimed democratic-legal values, i.e. the existence of a 
remarkable deficit of constitutionalism; 
• the low level of functional and institutional viability of the institutes of power; 
• the antagonism between politics and constitutionally made decisions; 
• and, as a consequence of all of the above, the accumulation of certain negative 
energy, which sometimes leads to multicolored socio-political explosions with 
inevitable tragic consequences. 
Fundamental constitutional vales in public practice may be implemented in life with 
guaranteed certainty only there and to the extent, where and to which extent the affirmation of 
constitutional democracy is the axial goal and topical agenda of public policy.They cannot 
be determined by considerations of momentary expediency, or cater to bureaucratic, 
clique or criminal interests.The assurance of real separation and balance of powers, the 
establishment of the power of the people, must transform from a mere motto into living 
reality. Every legal decision must emanate from the principle of the supremacy of law, which 
is the fundamental guarantee of stability and development. Where the supremacy of law ends, 
tyranny sets in. This is accomplished through adjusting the constitutional form of governance 
to current political interests. 
What impedes with the establishment of genuine constitutional democracy in conditions 
of social transformation? 
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 One needs to note that Article 26 of the Greek Constitution stipulates that the legislative functions 
shall be implemented by the Parliament and the President of the Republlic, the executive functions 
shall be implemented by the President and the Government, and judicial functions – by the courts, 
whose rullings are passed in the name of the Greek people. 
In our opinion there exists a multitude of reasons, among which I would like to 
particularly note the following: 
• inertia of the mentality, the mindset and lack of constitutional culture; 
• low level of legal awareness and insufficient political will to raise it; 
• imperfect constitutional and legal solutions, distorted perception and 
implementation of the fundamental principles of constitutional democracy in the 
legislative policy and implementation; 
• inadequate guarantees of the viability of democratic public structures and 
deformity of political institutions; 
• intensive mergers of political, economic and administrative powers, which 
significantly restrict the implementation of fundamental constitutional values in 
social practice and leads to the emergence of governmental-bureaucratic 
economic relations; 
• the high level of corruption, nepotism and shadow relations; 
• insufficient immune response on part of the social organism, determined by the 
tangle of above factors3. 
The countries in transition from a constitution to genuine constitutionalism must yet 
overcome many difficulties. Life itself is demonstrating quite persuasively that the 
development of constitutionalism may not be put to the service of current political 
expediency. It may not disrupt the balance and separation of powers, contribute to the merger 
of political, administrative and economic power, which inevitably results in the emergence of 
a corrupt pyramid of the state. 
Constitutionalism as the foundation of civil society cannot develop progressively in 
conditions of weak viability of democratic state systems and deformations of political 
institutions themselves. The intensive bonding of political, administrative and economic 
power, the high level of corruption, nepotism and shadow relations significantly limit the 
implementation of fundamental constitutional values in public turnover. 
The main goal of the successful implementation of social transformation is the 
consistency in the constitutionalization of public relations, along with overcoming the conflict 
between the constitution and the legal system in general. Only in these conditions one may 
ensure the necessary viability of the system of separation and balance of powers. In order to 
attain this one needs to overcome the principal cause. From the perspective of constitutional 
conflictology the cause, in our opinion, is exactly in the fact, that, by choosing the method of 
introducing model constitutions in many countries of young democracy, which, in turn, 
required to put a significant emphasis on the implementation of predominantly American and 
Pan European constitutional values, the respective societies faced the reality of transplanted 
values. The social organism of transition countries was apparently not prepared for such 
implants. In such a painful situation great opportunities emerge for the expressions of political 
adventurism, social demagogy and the criminalization of the economic system. 
More positive results were attained in countries where the public policy of socio-
economic and legal development took profound notice of the realities and, considering the 
objective features of social turnover, the necessary dynamism and evolutionary nature was 
ensured in the establishment of constitutional democracy. 
 
VI. The main prerequisites and general philosophy of ensuring the independence of 
constitutional justice 
A study of the international practice of functioning institutes of judicial constitutional 
review demonstrates that a system of constitutional justice may function fully, effectively and 
independently only upon the existence of the necessary and sufficient prerequisites. The 
following may rank among them: 
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 See Gagik H. Harutyunyan - CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE: THE LESSONS OF HISTORY AND THE 
CHALLENGES OF TIME. Yerevan, 2009, p. 197-201. 
• functional, institutional, organizational, material and social independence of 
judicial constitutional review; 
• consistency in constitutional implementation of the principle of separation of 
powers; 
• adequacy and comparability of the main constitutional principles and the 
respective constitutional mechanisms of exercising state power; 
• a match between the functions and powers of the specialized body of 
constitutional review, as well as a proper and justified selection of the objects of 
constitutional review; 
• determination of the optimal scope of subjects eligible to bring cases before the 
constitutional court; 
• systemic approach in ensuring the functional completeness of the judiciary; 
• ensuring the necessary level of constitutional adjudication; 
• setting an optimal balance in ensuring the independence of individual judges and 
the effective operation of constitutional courts in general; 
• attaining the necessary level of perception and implementation of democratic 
values within the society. 
If these criteria are applied to existing constitutions and implementation practice of the 
young democracy countries, then, unfortunately, one may in particular state, that: 
1) there exist certain discrepancies between fundamental constitutional principles 
and specific mechanisms for their realization; 
2) there exists a certain misbalance between constitutional functions and concrete 
powers of constitutional courts; 
3) the constitutional of destination of constitutional courts on the level of state 
power is sometimes perceived through the prism of political expediency, which 
impedes with the full implementation of functional, institutional, material and 
social independence of  the institutions of judicial constitutional review; 
4) no optimal solutions have been found in ensuring a systemic nature of 
constitutional powers, determining the objects and subjects of constitutional 
justice; 
5) in conditions of merger of political, administrative and economic power attempts 
are made to use the entire judiciary to cater to clan, criminal and mercantile-
political interests. 
The main goal of the improvement of the general system of constitutional review in 
conditions of social transformation is, in our opinion, exactly in ensuring the completeness, 
the systemic nature, independence and viability of constitutional justice. 
An analysis of the practice of establishment of constitutional justice in conditions of 
social transformation demonstrates that the basic principles, which must become the criterial 
basis for the formation of viable and independent system of constitutional justice, are as 
follows: a systemic nature of constitutional review; rational nature of the system and 
uninterruptibility of its operation; preventive nature of review; self-restrictive nature of the 
functioning of the system; effectiveness of the institutional system and functional 
completeness of constitutional courts; organic combination of functional, institutional, 
organizational and procedural elements in exercising constitutional review; ensuring multi-
faceted feedback with social practice and preventing new disruptions of constitutional balance 
while rectifying the violated equilibrium. 
In order for all this to happen one needs to first and foremost ensure the functional 
independence of constitutional justice.4The more than 110 specialized bodies of constitutional 
review that exist in the world today, exercise the total of 37 various powers. No single 
constitutional court is vested with all of those powers at the same time. Neither it is possible 
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 We maintain that in the absence of clear separation and interconnection of the functional and 
institutional independence of the entire judicary it would be equally impossible to realistically 
guarantee in practice the independence and viability of constitutional justice. 
to distinguish at least two constitutional courts that would possess completely identical 
powers. This is only natural, since they reflect specific social relations along with the concrete 
features thereof. At the same time all existing constitutional courts may conventionally e 
divided into three groups: 
those that possess more than 15-16 powers in implementing normative constitutional 
review, interpreting the constitution and the laws, resolving competence disputes, directly 
protecting constitutional human rights, as well as having a broad scope of subjects eligible to 
apply to the constitutional court; 
the second group may include constitutional courts that possess from 10 to 15 basic 
constitutional powers in exercising constitutional justice, and a relatively narrow scope of 
eligible applicants; 
the third group includes constitutional courts that face serious problems of maturing, that 
not only have limited powers, but also a scope of applicants that makes the exercise of those 
powers virtually impracticable. 
It is not incidental that some constitutional courts annually pass hundreds, if not 
thousands of rulings, whereas there are constitutional courts that pass not more than a dozen 
final rulings a year. 
We are convinced that constitutional justice may not enjoy sufficient functional 
independence and viability, unless the acts, actions and inaction of all constitutional 
institutions become the object of judicial constitutional review, and all constitutional 
institutions become subjects eligible to apply to the constitutional court.5 
A study of the mechanisms of formation of the institutes of constitutional review, with a 
notice given to the specifics of social transformation, demonstrates that, unfortunately, many 
problems of constitutional review are sometimes viewed and addressed from the perspective 
of political expediency, through half-measures, in detachment, something that by the end of 
the day fails to lead to the establishment of an effective system of guaranteeing the supremacy 
of constitutional values. 
The entire course of the 20th century has proven that faith, tradition, ethical norms, the 
entire value system of social behavior, as well as other mechanisms of systemic self-defense 
have failed to fully ensure a dynamic balance and sustainable development of the society in 
conditions of the new realities. The main challenges of the contemporary period are exactly in 
forming a viable system of internal self-defense of the social organism. This becomes 
possible through guaranteed assurance of the supremacy of the constitution. It follows from 
this that the main function of judicial constitutional review is the same for any legal system: 
to ensure, alongside other bodies of state power, the supremacy and direct effect of the 
constitution. 
Therefore functionally viable and complete constitutional courts, that stand among the 
recent accomplishments of human mind, are called upon, through their legal positions, to 
impart real substance to constitutional values, ensure constitutional dynamism and 
development for the society. Only the successful implementation of this fundamental 
functional role shall make it possible to guarantee the supremacy and direct effect of the 
constitution of a democratic country, which is also one of the characteristic features of the 
constitutional culture in the 21st century. 
 
VII. What is the recommendation of practical experience? 
In Armenia the evolution of constitutional justice breaks down into qualitatively 
different phases. The first phase includes the establishment and development of the system 
prior to the constitutional reforms in the year 2005. The second phase commences with the 
constitutional amendments and the enacting in 2006 of the new Law on the Constitutional 
Court. 
From the perspective of the issue discussed here the main characteristic feature of the 
second phase is that the constitutional-legal bases of the independence and viability of 
constitutional justice in Armenia have become stronger. 
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 We intend this language to also refer to other institutions of judicial constitutional review. 
The principle of the rule of law got more clearly enshrined on the level of the 
Constitution. Article 93 thereof stipulates that constitutional justice in the Republic of 
Armenia is exercised by the Constitutional Court. The amendment to Article 94 is of even 
higher relevance, according to which while the powers, the procedure for the formation and 
operation of the courts is defined by the constitution and the laws, the powers and the 
procedure for the formation of the constitutional court is determined by the constitution, and 
the procedure for its operation is determined by the constitution and the Law on the 
Constitutional Court. This is especially important, since in Armenia there exists no institute of 
organic vs. constitutional laws, and the Law on the Constitutional Court is a plain law. This 
means that it may practically be amended by a simple majority of the members of the 
Parliament present and voting. 
Another important step was the significant expansion of the scope of subjects eligible to 
apply to the Constitutional Court. Article 101 of the constitution also provided for the 
introduction of individual complaint. Our practice has convincingly affirmed that citizens’ 
applications to the Constitutional Court represents not only a mechanism of guaranteeing and 
protecting their constitutional rights, but much more. This institute ensures real participation 
of citizens in the constitutional process, and thus becomes a new and effective mechanism for 
the exercise of direct power of the people. Nowadays more than 90 percent of the cases on the 
constitutionality of normative acts is heard by the Constitutional Court on the basis of 
individual complaints. Within the last 2.5 years the Constitutional Court has ruled the norms 
of particular laws unconstitutional in 32 such cases. Practice has demonstrated that the 
independence and viability of the Constitutional Court are significantly strengthened when 
the Court has a real impact on the constitutional processes in the country. This is more 
difficult than we may think, even impossible without ensuring the right of citizens to 
constitutional justice and guaranteed direct effect of constitutional rights. 
The new Law of the Constitutional Court was adopted on the basis of a positive opinion 
of the Venice Commission and it provides for the necessary procedural mechanisms for 
increasing the effectiveness and strengthening the independence of the Constitutional Court. I 
shall dwell only on several aspects. A systemic implementation was accomplished of 
examining cases ex officio, without limiting the court to applications or petitions by parties to 
litigation, or evidence submitted by the latter and other materials within the case. Institutions 
were introduced for documentary examination of cases, dissenting opinion of a judge, deferral 
of lapse of an unconstitutional norm, retroactive effect of the court’s ruling, etc., which 
significantly strengthened the legal bases of constitutional jurisprudence. The legal positions 
of the constitutional court became an important source of law. On their basis the Parliament 
of Armenia introduced amendments to more than thirty legislative acts within the last two 
years. These rulings provide an effective mechanism for identifying and overcoming 
legislative lacunas. The results of the international conference, held in Yerevan in October of 
2009, on the international experience of interaction of constitutional courts and the 
parliaments in guaranteeing the supremacy of the constitution demonstrated that the 
independence of constitutional courts provides an irreplaceable safeguard for the 
strengthening of constitutional lawfulness and establishing balanced relations between 
institutions of power in the country. 
 
VIII. Principal conclusions 
The theory of separation of powers that Charles Montesquieu developed as an 
independent teaching, and which later became the basis for the American constitutional 
doctrine to ensure the separation and balance of the legislative, executive and judicial powers, 
has no constitutional-legal alternative for the rule of law state. 
All attempts to “devise” new branches of power are flawed and result from a lack of a 
clear understanding of the specifics of functional and institutional axes for the interaction of 
institutes of state power. 
From the perspective of assuring the viability of power the main goal of constitutional 
architecture is, first and foremost, in guaranteeing equilibrium in the system function-
institution-power. Whereupon all three branches of power shall be functionally independent 
and may implement their functions through concrete constitutional institutions of state power. 
In conditions of social transformation there exists a significant detachment of 
fundamental constitutional values and principles from the social reality. The latter is 
characterized by the low level of constitutional culture, systemic inadequacy of the 
mechanisms that ensure the rule of law, a formal and politicized nature of the system of 
separation of powers, the existence of a distorted, internally contradictive legal system, the 
absence of a uniform value-based systemic understanding of societal bearings in social 
development. 
The system of separation and balance of powers is in organic unity both with other 
constitutional principles and provisions, and the socials practice. It is the predominant 
indicator of the maturity of constitutionalism in any country. This system requires that: firstly, 
both the internal structure of the constitution and all concrete constitutional decisions be 
based on clear functional separation of the powers of constitutional institutions of power, 
irrespective of the form of governance; secondly, that an equilibrium between freedom, power 
and the law be established, demanded by the society. It is also necessary to functionally and 
institutionally guarantee the uninterruptibility, elected nature, accountability and rotation of 
power, which are the bases for the establishment of constitutional democracy, at the same 
time ruling out the antagonism between constitutional rulings and social practice, preventing 
the emergence of shadow power. 
 Judicial constitutional control, as a relatively new and successfully developing system 
for strengthening the immune sufficiency of the social organism, is capable to fully assure the 
supremacy, direct effect and self-sufficiency of the Constitution only in conditions of 
functional, institutional, material and social independence. 
In conditions of social transformation the main principles that must become the criterial 
basis for the formation of a viable and independent system of constitutional justice are: the 
systemic nature of constitutional control; the rational nature of the system and the 
uninterruptibility of its operation; the preventive nature of control; self-restriction of the 
functioning of the system; efficiency of the institutional system and functional completeness 
of constitutional courts; the organic combination of the functional, institutional, 
organizational and procedural axes in the administration of constitutional justice; ensuring 
multi-faceted feedback with social practice and preventing new disruptions of constitutional 
balance while rectifying the violated equilibrium. 
Constitutional justice shall attain the necessary functional independence and viability 
when the action or inaction of all constitutional institutions will become the object of judicial 
constitutional control, and all constitutional institutions will become subjects entitled to 
appeal to the constitutional court. 
Thank you for your attention. 
